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There is yet to be a consensus among economists as to the true benefits of 
decentralization both on the theoretical and empirical level. Nevertheless this 
has not stopped various countries from proceeding with the decentralizing of 
their economies. Indeed certain studies have shown that out of the 77 
developing and transition countries with populations greater than 7 million, 63 
have embarked on some form of fiscal decentralization (Helmsing, 1999; 
Ebel, 2000). The main objective of this paper is to shed more lights on the 
relationship between decentralization and macroeconomic stability. Even 
though there is a huge literature both theoretically and empirically on the 
impact of decentralization, not many of them seems to be interested on the 
question of the link between decentralization and macroeconomic stability. It 
is thus our hope trough this paper to fill this gap in the literature. 
 































The debates on the benefits of decentralization are far from being 
conclusive both on the theoretical and empirical level, but this has not stopped 
various countries from proceeding with the decentralizing of their economies. 
Indeed certain studies have shown that out of the 77 developing and transition 
countries with populations greater than 7 million, 63 have embarked on some 
form of fiscal decentralization (Helmsing, 1999; Ebel, 2000)1.  
 
 In this paper, we will look at one issue about decentralization that we 
believe has been scantily analyzed in the literature namely the effects of 
decentralization on macroeconomic stability.  Our main objective here is to try 
to shed more lights on the issue notably by looking at other dimensions of 
macroeconomic stability than what are usually used in precedent studies as 
well as by examining other factors that might accentuate or diminish the 
effects of decentralization on macroeconomic stability2. 
 
 Even though there is no precise definition of macroeconomic 
instability, the concept is usually understood as a situation of a situation of 
economic malaise, where the economy does not seem to have settled in a 
steady position, and where, eventually, something needs to be done for putting 
it back on track (Azam 2000). Roughly speaking, everything that is going 
wrong in a country’s macroeconomic condition such as high inflation, 
overvalued currency, unstable real exchange rate, balance of payment deficit, 
or fiscal deficit is often called macroeconomic instability. To put it differently, 
macroeconomic instability refers to phenomena that make the domestic 
                                                 
 
1 This trend towards decentralization can be seen according to several authors as a final stage 
of the dialectical movement of the development paradigm (Bardhan and Mokherjee 2005, 
Sharma 2004).Till mid 1980s, the paradigm was in favour of more economic role for the state 
which then gave rise to the extreme forms of centralization. The centralized decision making 
was seen as a way to rationalize scarce resources and depoliticize the masses while 
decentralization was viewed as likely to heighten cleavages, political radical ethnic and 
religious (Scheineder 2003). However in late 1980s and early 1990s, an obsession with 
curtailing the economic role of the state and reducing the size of the public sector, as these 
were seen as major causes for financial crisis in the developing countries have led to the 
emergence of the second phase. The public sector far from being regarded as engine of 
development came to be perceived as an obstacle to it. Then by mid 1990s, a renewed 
appreciation of the public sector’s development role especially the subnational governments 
began to emerge.  
 
2It is also interesting to note that the question of macroeconomic stability itself has been 
exiguously analyzed in the literature. As it is put by Satyanath and Subramaniam (2004), 
“ It is surprising that while so much of the recent literature has been devoted 
to, even obsessed with, explaining the cross-country variation in real 
variables—for example, in income..there has been much less of a concern with 
analyzing the cross-country variation in nominal or macroeconomic 
instability. This is despite the fact that the cross-country variation in nominal 
or macroeconomic instability is even more astounding than that in income” 




macroeconomic environment less predictable and it can take the form of 
volatility of key macroeconomic variables or of unsustainability in their 
behavior.  
 
The paper starts by reviewing the theoretical and empirical studies that 
have been done so far on the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic 
instability.  Based on this review, we will show that there is yet to be a 
consensus both at the theoretical and empirical level, among economists as far 
as the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic instability are concerned.  
Section 2 presents our econometric approach as well as our results. Finally 
section 3 concludes.         
 
2. The Relationship between Macroeconomic Stability and 
Decentralization 
 
 It is noteworthy that there is a slight tendency to associate 
decentralization with less macroeconomic stability owing notably to the fact 
that decentralization is usually accompanied by an increase of autonomy level 
of the local governments. Ahmad et al (2005) held that macroeconomic 
stability for a country or supranational economic union depends on the overall 
aggregate exposure to risk—and a critical element of the latter is the 
borrowing of all the component jurisdictions in the relevant country or 
economic union. Decentralization means that local governments will be 
granted more power in determining the level of their expenses as well as their 
revenues. This in turn means that central government will have less power to 
control the behavior of the subnational governments. Adding to this is the 
coordination problem that will emerge among the subnational governments 
which usually have their own agendas to pursue. In a decentralized system, 
subnational governments respond to different constituencies. And herein lies 
the cause of policy divergence across level of governments (Riker 1987). 
According to Wibbels (2000) policy divergence is more likely to happen when 
it comes to economic reforms as voters usually hold the national and not 
subnational governments responsible for macroeconomic performance. 
Besides, international pressures also tend to focus on the performances of 
national governments. And since subnational governments are in a way 
insulated from the country’s macroeconomic situation, their adjustment 
policies are subject to collective action problem. From the point of view of 
provincial politicians, the gains achieved via state-level economic reform 
cannot be contained within state boundaries because state economies are open. 
Furthermore, the impact of any one state’s reform efforts is likely to be 
marginal in terms of the overall success of economic adjustment. As a result, 
the free rider problem becomes operational. Economic adjustment takes on the 
quality of public good requiring the individual states to cooperate, but it is 
more rational for individual provincial politicians to avoid the political costs 
associated with austerity. Under these circumstances, the coordination of 
national fiscal and monetary policies as adjustment tools is complicated, 
posing a challenge to national economic stability (Prud’homme 1995, 




decentralized system have an important subnational component. As compared 
to a unitary system, these threats to macroeconomic performance are largely 
moot as local governments are merely the bureaucrats extensions of central 
governments. Absent the divergent incentives and political autonomy 
generated by the decentralization process, subnational officials in centralized 
countries are responsible to their national government and therefore have few 
motives to resist economic reforms.  
 
 On the other hand, under the logic of commitment problem, 
decentralization is associated with more price and macro stability. In the 
literature, high inflation is attributed to the inability of policymakers to 
commit credibly to monetary restraint which in turn is due to the fact that high 
inflation, regardless of its costs, is their dominant strategy (Barro and Gordon 
1983, Kydland and Presscott 1977). These studies show that if markets expect 
low inflation, increasing the money supply will have positive real effects and 
if markets expect high inflation, it is still less costly in the short run to 
accommodate these expectations rather than to thwart them. Fiscal 
decentralization may make it more difficult for policymakers to renege on 
their commitment for price stability. The competition among lower levels of 
governments may reduce their incentives to renege on stable monetary policy 
(Qian and Rolland 1998). The credibility of the commitment to price stability 
can be established if the monetary authority adheres to a set of formal rules3 or 
if there is a guarantee that it is independent from any pressures from all levels 
of government (Barro 19964, Shah 1994). And empirical studies show that 
central bank independence is correlated with lower inflation rates. Fiscal 
decentralization can also enhance the independence of central bank. For 
example over the period 1955 to 1988, the three countries which are 
considered as having the most independent central banks (Switzerland with the 
National Bank of Switzerland, Germany with the Bundesbank and the United 
States with the Federal Reserve Board), had average inflation rates of 4.4 
percent compared to 7.8 percent for the three least independent banks (New 
Zealand until 1989, Spain and Italy). The inflation rate in the former countries 
is also showed to be of lower volatility. Shah (2005) argued that with 
decentralization the central bank will be more independent since a 
decentralized system would require a more clarified rules and regulations 
                                                 
 
3 For example, in 1991 Argentina adopted the Convertibility Law that established parity in the 
value of the peso in terms of the US dollar Argentina’s central bank has also strengthened the 
credibility of its commitment to price stability by enduring a severe contraction in the 
monetary base during the period December 1994 to March 1995 as speculative reactions to the 
Mexican crisis resulted in a decline in its foreign exchange reserves. In 1994 Brazil adopted 
the Real Plan to help achieve a measure of this level of credibility.  
 
4 Barro is very preoccupied with price stability that he regards an ideal central banker as one 
who is not necessarily a good macro economist but one whose commitment to price stability is 
unshakable. According to the author, “The ideal central banker should always appear somber 






under which a central bank operates as well as its functions and its 
relationships with different level of governments. Huther and Shah (1996) find 
a weak but positive association between fiscal decentralization and central 
bank independence. In Brazil, when the government introduced a 
decentralized federal constitution in 1988, the independence of the central 
bank is significantly enhanced (Bomfim and Shah 1994, Shah 1991). Lohman 
(1998) argued that Germany’s low inflation in the postwar can be partly 
attributed to the independence of the Bundesbank which was enhanced by the 
way it was embedded into the country’s federal institutions. According to the 
author, a majority of the bank’s council members were appointed by the 
Lander governments. Central and Land elections were staggered and the 
parties dominating the two governments often differed. The Landers were also 
represented in the Buderast which could veto changes to central bank 
legislation. All these factors serve as checks and balances on the attempts by 
the central government to inflate the economy in order to gain popularity 
during elections. 
 
On the empirical grounds, there have been very few studies that 
analyze the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic stability and almost 
all of them used the inflation rate as their indicator for macroeconomic 
instability. 
  
King and Ma (2001) examined the effects of centralization on inflation 
using data that covered 42 countries over the period of 1973-1994. However, 
they only found a significant positive correlation between centralization and 
inflation when they omitted from their sample “high-inflation” countries 
defined here as those who have an average inflation of more than 20%. They 
also found that the inclusion of centralization in their regression gives central 
bank independence the right sign (negatively correlated with inflation rate). 
The paper was later reinvestigated by Neyapti (2003 who argued that 
decentralization and central bank independence reinforce each other in  
determining the inflation rate since decentralising revenue collection by itself 
need not be efficient as local authorities have much more limited tax bases 
available to them as well as limited capacity to issue debt. Moreover, the 
author argued that local autonomy in collecting local revenues may be 
constrained for political considerations. Hence, he hypothesized that revenue 
decentralization leads to lower inflation provided that monetary discipline 
exists, and not necessarily otherwise. This is because, even if local 
accountability exists, the cost of inflationary monetary expansion resulting 
from individual actions of local governments is not fully internalised by local 
governments. He thus took both local accountability, as a fiscal disciplinary 
device and central bank independence, as a proxy for monetary discipline, into 
account to assess the relationship between RD and inflation. His empirical 
investigation demonstrates that, controlling for business cycles, openness and 
government size, revenue decentralization has significant negative effect on 
inflation only in low inflation countries. Moreover, the additional effect of the 
interaction between decentralization and central bank independence is 




and Ma’s observation of the significant effect of central bank independence. 
Neyapti observed, however, that decentralization has a significant negative 
effect on inflation also in higher inflation countries when coupled with both 
central bank independence and local accountability. More recently, Vazquez 
and McNab (2005) found that decentralization appears to promote price 
stability. Their results are consistent both in the full and sub-sample of 
developed, developing and transitional countries. This suggests according to 
the authors that their results are not dependant on the level of development.  
 
However, Treisman (2000) found that fiscal decentralization have no 
significant correlation with inflation. The author used three indictors of 
decentralization namely whether the country is classified as federal according 
to Elazar (1987), the share of subnational spending of the total government 
spending and the share of subnational revenue of the total government 
revenue. The author found that none of these three variables have a noticeable 
effect on inflation with coefficients close to zero. The results were confirmed 
by Rodden and Wibbels (2002). The authors found that although there is a 
positively correlation between fiscal decentralization and inflation, the relation 
does not achieve statistical significance. Thornton (2007) examines the issue 
of revenue decentralization and inflation focusing on the share of the revenues 
of sub-national governments over which they have full autonomy. Results 
from panel least squares regressions of 19 OECD member countries for which 
data on the degree of revenue autonomy in 1995 was available suggest that, 
when measured in this way, the impact of revenue decentralization on inflation 
is not statistically significant. According to Thornton, these results suggest that 
countries that shift a large share of revenues to sub-national governments are 
able to pursue better policies at the national level and not a reflection of 
relatively more responsible fiscal policies at the level of sub-national 
governments. One possible explanation for this situation is that revenue 
sharing arrangements in such countries act to reduce competition for fiscal 
resources between sub-national governments.  
 
Based on the literature review above, it is quite obvious to see that 
there are still lots to be done as far as the links between decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability are concerned. Not only that the studies have failed 
to acknowledge other aspects of macroeconomic stability, they seemed to 
ignore various other factors that could influence directly or indirectly the 
effects of decentralization on macroeconomic stability. One type of variables 
that we believe to be rather important is the ones that capture the existing 
institutional and political arrangements of the country in question such as the 
quality of the government, democracy, political stability or the level of 
corruption. As shown by our review of literature in the preceding section, 
these variables have been widely studied notably from the angle of the impact 
that decentralization may have on them. However there are yet any studies that 
try to examine the impact that these variables may have on the impact of 
decentralization on macroeconomic stability. It is not too farfetched to assume 
for example that the impact of a decentralization process on macroeconomic 




governance index level. These institutional variables may be introduced into 
the framework either directly or indirectly through their interaction with other 
more traditional independent variables. Such interactions may have been 
widely covered in other studies of decentralization but they are yet to be 
introduced into the regressions between decentralization and macroeconomic 
stability. 
 
3. Econometric Estimation 
 
 The hypothesis that we want to test here is whether decentralization 
will lead to more or less macroeconomic instability. Given the inconclusive 
debate on the theoretical grounds we do not have any a priori as to the sign of 
correlation between these two variables.  
 
3.1. Data Description 
 
 In this section we describe the data and the measures we use for our 
econometric analysis. Our data covers 62 countries from the period of 1972 to 
2001. The list of the countries that constitute our sample as well as the 
definition and sources of all data are given in the appendix.  
 
 This data set is structured as a panel with observations for each country 
consisting of five-year averages. Each country has six observations: 1972-
1976, 1977-1981, 1982-1986, 1986-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001. The panel 
is, however, not balanced because some observations are missing for a number 
of countries. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables.  
 
3.1.1. Decentralization data 
 
 Data related to decentralization are mostly obtained from the 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) which are collected and published by the 
International Monetary Fund. More precisely the following indicators will be 
used as our measure of decentralization 
• the percentage of subnational governments expenditure of the 
total government expenditures 
• the percentage of subnational governments revenues of the total 
government revenues. 
 
The used of GFS data to measure the extent of decentralization have 
been widely criticized in the literature5. This has led to the use of other type of 
indicators as well as to the construction of new database by some authors. 
However compelling the use of these data may be, it will not serve our 
purpose here as they are only available for certain developed countries.  
 
 
                                                 
 




3.1.2. Data of Macroeconomic Stability 
 
In this study we will use two variables as a measure of macroeconomic 
instability 
• the inflation rate 
• the change in the de facto market exchange rate (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2004)6. 
 
3.2. Econometric Specification 
 
Using the data described above, we estimate the following model 
 
ititititit uZPolFDMS +′++= δββ 21     (1) 
 
Where MSit is the measure of macrostability represented here by the 
inflation rate and the evolution of the de facto exchange rate. Following 
Neyapti (2003), we use a linear transformation of the rate of inflation that 
scales it down to the range between zero and one. The formula used for the 
linear transformation is as follows:- 
  
Inf = [inflation rate/1+inflation rate]    (2) 
 
The transformation will allow us to control for the large variance in 
inflation across countries and over time. FDit is the measure of fiscal 
decentralization, Polit denotes a measure of political institutions which will be 
represented by four variables: the level of political rights, the democracy level, 
the polity and the constraint on executive. The Zit matrix comprises of several 
control regressor (M2 as a percentage of GDP, the index of central bank 
independence, the per capita GDP, the total population, the government size, 
the openness to international trade and the level of corruption). And finally uit 
is the error term.  
 
We start by testing for the presence of endogeneity problem in our 
estimation. In the case of our main independent variables, the results show that 
we fail to reject the exogeneity of the fiscal decentralization with respect to all 
                                                 
 
6 Following Satyanath and Subramaniam (2004), there are mainly two reasons why we 
decided to include the de facto exchange rate as our indicator of macroeconomic stability. 
First, price level especially in the developing countries is not what can be considered as a clear 
market-based measure. This is because for long periods of time in the post-war period, prices 
have been controlled and/or fixed and as such they do not really respond to underlying 
macroeconomic conditions. In many developing countries, even with a turn toward 
liberalization since the mid-to late 1980s, prices of nontradables, especially utilities, remain 
regulated, and hence may not convey all the information about underlying macroeconomic 
disequilibria. Second, any measure of nominal instability should reflect problems stemming 
from debt accumulation, rescheduling or accumulation of arrears, and other external 
pathologies which also reflect macroeconomic disequilibria. From this perspective, the market 





our dependant variables. We also fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of several of our control variables namely the GDP per capita, the 
M2 and the openness variable.  
 
We then examine whether a fixed or a random effect model is more 
appropriate for the estimation of equation 17. The results of the tests seem to 
differ according to our dependant variable. When the rate of inflation is used 
as the dependant variable, the test is in favor of a random effect specification. 
Where else when we switch to the de facto exchange rate, the test is in favor 
of a fixed effect specification. Consequently, we use the random effect model 
in estimating our model when the dependant variable is the inflation rate and 





3.3.1. Baseline Regressions  
 
The results of our baseline estimations are presented in table 2 to table 
5.  
 
In table 2, the dependant variable is the inflation rate and fiscal 
decentralization is measured as the proportion of subnational expenditures to 
total expenditures. In column A (table 2), we estimate our regressions without 
controlling for corruption and political institutions. The results show that there 
is no significant relationship between inflation and decentralization. Inflation 
rate appears not to be influenced by decentralization.  
 
In column B (table 2), we introduce in our regression a variable 
representing the level of corruption. It is quite striking to see that once we 
control for corruption, the rate of inflation becomes significantly correlated 
with the level of expenditure decentralization. The estimated coefficient for 
expenditure decentralization is found to be significant at the 1% level. The 
results suggest that in contrary to popular belief of a negative effect of 
decentralization on macroeconomic stability, an increase in expenditure 
decentralization, all else being equal, would lead to a decrease in the inflation 
rate. As for the level of corruption, it is also found to be highly correlated with 
the rate of inflation. An increase in the level of perceived corruption will lead 
to an increase in the level of inflation. 
  
                                                 
 
7 The null hypothesis of the Haussman (1978) test is that, assuming that both OLS and GLS 
are consistent, OLS is inefficient, the alternative being OLS is consistent but GLS is not. In 
other words, the Haussman statistic tests for the correlation between the individual effects and 
explanatory variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis thus leads to the rejection of random 





These results are suggestive to the importance of taking into account 
institutional and political settings in assessing the impact of decentralization. 
In order to further verify this, we include in our regressions several other 
variables that are supposed to capture the institutional and political context of 
a country. The results are reported in column C to F (table 2). However, as we 
can see from table 2, none of these four variables appear to have a significant 
relationship with the rate of inflation. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these 
political variables does not alter the correlation between decentralization and 
inflation. The latter remains negatively correlated with decentralization.  
 
As for other control variables, M2 are found to be significantly related 
to the rate of inflation. The latter is found to be positively related to M2.  And 
once we control for political and institutional variables (column B to F, table 
2), a negative and significant correlation is found between the rate of inflation 
and the GDP per capita. An increase in the level of GDP is thus associated 
with a decrease in the level of inflation. The results are similar to the one 
found in other studies (Neyapti 2003; Vazquez and McNab, 2005; Thornton, 
2007).  
 
In table 3, we replace our measure of fiscal decentralization with that 
of the proportion of subnational revenue of the total revenue. Our results are 
somehow similar to the ones found previously. However, in contrary to 
expenditure decentralization, revenue decentralization appears to be negatively 
correlated with the inflation rate even if we do not control for corruption or 
political institutions. Nevertheless when we introduce corruption and political 
instutions in our estimations, the statistical significance of the coefficient for 
decentralization has improved.  
 
Table 4 and 5 summarize the results found when we use the change in 
de facto exchange rate as our dependant variable. In table 4, the level of 
decentralization is represented by the proportion of subnational expenditure to 
total expenditure where else in table 5, we use the proportion of subnational 
revenue to total revenue as our measure of decentralization.  
 
As shown by table 4, we do not find any significant correlation 
between expenditure decentralization and the change in de facto exchange 
rate. But in contrary to the results found previously with inflation rate as the 
dependant variable, there appears to be a significant correlation between the 
change in exchange rate and the political variables. All four variables 
representing the political and institutional setting are found to be negatively 
correlated with the exchange rate. An increase in political rights, democracy or 
the constraint on the executive leads to a more stable exchange rate. We also 
found the corruption level to be positively correlated the change in the 
exchange rate which signifies that an increase in the perceived level of 
corruption will lead to an increase in macro instability.  
 
The results change when we use the share of subnational’ revenue as 




exchange rate is found to be negatively influenced by the revenue 
decentralization. Note that again the correlation only become significant once 
we control for corruption and political variables (column B to F, table 5). As 
for the control variables, we found that all the political variables except for 
one (the political rights) to be significantly correlated with the change in the 
exchange rate. The results signify that a country that has a good governance 
track record will also have a stable exchange rate. 
 
3.3.2. The Conditional Effects of Corruption and Political Institutions 
 
In previous section we have shown that our measure of 
macroeconomic stability can be influenced by the level of perceived 
corruption or by political institutions. It is thus interesting to see if in addition 
to these direct effects, these same variables will also have an impact on the 
effect of decentralization on macroeconomic stability. It seems natural to 
argue that a positive effect of decentralization on macroeconomic stability will 
somehow be attenuated if the country is plagued with a serious problem of 
corruption. In contrary, a country which is free from corruption will be able to 
fully benefit from the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic stability. 
It can also be argued that a more stable political environment may accentuate 
the impact of decentralization on macroeconomic stability and vice versa. 
 
In order to test for the assumptions of an indirect effect of corruption 
and political institutions on macroeconomic stability, we introduce in our 
equation the interaction term between these variables with our measure of 
decentralization. If the results show that the estimated parameters of the 
interaction term are positive then it may suggest that the corruption or political 
variables are having a positive impact on the effect of decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
We present the results for each indicator of macroeconomic stability in 
table 6. In column A (table 6), the dependant variable is the inflation rate 
while decentralization is measured by the proportion of subnational 
governments’ expenditure to total government, expenditure. The results of the 
estimation show that decentralization has a negative impact on the level of 
inflation. But none of the coefficients estimates of the interaction term are 
statistically significant which signifies that the impact of expenditure 
decentralization on inflation is not influenced by corruption and political 
institutions. It is noteworthy that the level of perceived corruption continues to 





 The main objective of this chapter is to shed more lights on the 
relationship between decentralization and macroeconomic stability. Even 
though there is a huge literature both theoretically and empirically on the 




question of the link between decentralization and macroeconomic stability. It 
is thus our hope to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
Based on our literature review, it is quite obvious to see that there are 
still lots to be done as far as the links between decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability are concerned. It is also noteworthy that so far, the 
studies that have been done in this area seemed to ignore various other factors 
that could influence directly or indirectly the effects of decentralization on 
macroeconomic stability. One type of variables that we believe to be rather 
important is the ones that capture the existing institutional and political setting 
of the country in question. These variables have been widely studied notably 
from the angle of the impact that decentralization may have on them. However 
there are yet any studies that try to examine the impact that these variables 
may have on the impact of decentralization on macroeconomic stability.  We 
have thus included in our study several indicators of political institutions as 
well as a variable representing the corruption level.  
 
We have also used in our study other variables as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability besides inflation rate. Price stability may be one of 
the main indicators of macroeconomic stability but it is far from being the 
only one given the wide spectrum which the term macroeconomic stability 
covers.  
 
The empirical results provided in this study despite data inadequacies 
and methodological shortcoming point to the fact that there is a negative 
relationship between certain variable of macroeconomic stability and 
decentralization. In our baseline estimations, we found that decentralization 
appears to lead to a decrease in inflation rate and in the change of de facto 
exchange rate. However, we do not find any correlation between 
decentralization with the level of fiscal deficit. The results suggest that 
decentralization does not deteriorate nor ameliorate the fiscal balance of a 
country. Our results seem to run counter to a rapidly growing popular belief 
that decentralization is disastrous to macroeconomic stability. As far as our 
results are concerned, fiscal decentralization is manifestly not a recipe for 
disaster.  
 
Our results also show that the impact of decentralization to be conditional on 
the level of perceived corruption and political institutions. It is found that the 
impact of decentralization on macroeconomic stability can be attenuated if 















Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min Max 
Inflation 287 0.8568 0.2316 -0.5252 3.5660 
Exchange rate 276 39.1493 181.3336 -45.4418 911.893 
Exp. Decentralization 261 26.2867 17.0294 1.4547 75.7473 
Rev. Decentralization 252 19.0472 15.3016 0.6279 76.4074 
GDP 287 9927.86 9234.279 137.5408 41559.24 
M2 210 61.5306 212.347 1.5304 1852.052 
Population 312 6.55e+07 1.85e+08 164949.6 1.25e+09 
Openness 287 68.1632 42.4824 8.6815 258.4703 
C. Bank Independence  131 0.4680 0.1930 0.17 0.89 
Corruption 186 6.0889 2.4440 0.2 9.8099 
Democracy 265 5.3524 7.6298 -52.8 10 
Executive Constraints 265 4.2709 6.6405 -52.4 7 
Polity 265 3.5426 9.4227 -56.8 10 
Political Rights 303 2.6712 2.0270 -1.8 7 





































-0.0020   
(0.0021)   
-0.0057***  
(0.0021)    
-0.0070***  
(0.0022)    
-0.0063**   
(0.0031)    
-0.0063**   
(0.0031)    
-0.0064**   
(0.0031)    
Central bank 
independence 
-0.0352   
(0.1356)    
-0.1171   
(0.1355) 
-0.2026   
(0.1432)    
-0.0621   
(0.1929)    
-0.0510   
(0.1945)    
-0.0657   
(0.1925)    
M2 0.0723***   
(0.0203)    




0.1030***   
(0.0252)    
0.1039***   
(0.0249)    
0.1023***   
(0.0254)    
GDP -0.0089   




(0.0382)    
-0.1872***  
(0.0554)    
-0.1933***  
(0.0562)    
-0.1838***  
(0.0550)    
Openness -0.0007   
(0.0007)    
-0.0004   
(0.0008)  
-0.0001   
(0.0007)    
-0.0000   
(0.0010)    
-0.0000   
(0.0010)    
-0.0000   
(0.0010)    
Population -0.0020   
(0.0198)    
0.0197   
(0.0206)  
0.0303   
(0.0214)    
0.0342   
(0.0305)    
0.0352   
(0.0311)    
0.0333   
(0.0303)    
Corruption  -0.0777***  
(0.0233)  
-0.0675***  
(0.0231)    
-0.1312***  
(0.0317)    
 -
0.1352***   
(0 0321)
-0.1291***  
(0.0318)    
Political Rights   -.035347   
(0.0261)  
   
Democracy    0.0016   
(0.0029) 
  





     0.0016   
(0.0032)  
Constant 0.8448*  
(0.4979)    
1.0559**   
(0.5099)    
1.0690**   
(0.4923)    
1.0359   
(0.7398)    
1.0460   
(0.7479)    
1.0413   
(0.7334) 
R2  0.3801     0.5046     0.5942   0.3278     0.3269     0.3291     
No of obs 294 294 294 294 294 294 
No of countries 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, 













   
















-0.0045*   
(0.0026) 
     
-0.0069***  
(0.0026)    
-0.0081***  
(0.0025)    
-0.0088**   
(0.0039)    
-0.0089**   
(0.0039)    
-0.0088**   
(0.0038)    
Central bank 
independence 
-0.0516   
(0.1358) 
     
-0.0749   
(0.1380)    
-0.1491   
(0.1401)    
-0.0741   
(0.1926)    
-0.0673   
(0.1937)    
-0.076   
(0.1925)    
M2 0.0681***   
(0.0201) 
      
0.0892***  
(0.0219)    
0.0777***   
(0.0222)    
0.1058***   
(0.0242)    
0.1061***   
(0.0241)    
0.1054***   
(0.0245)    
GDP 0.0059   
(0.0279) 
      
-0.0924**   
(0.0426)    
-0.0772*   
(0.0396)    
-0.1631***  
(0.0578)    
-0.1688***  
(0.0586)    
-0.1594***  
(0.0574)    
Openness -0.0008   
(0.0007)    
-0.0002   
(0.0008) 
     
0.0001   
(0.0008)    
0.0000   
(0.0010)    
0.0000   
(0.0010)    
0.0000   
(0.0010)    
Population 0.0058   
(0.0198)    
0.0262   
(0.0224)    
0.0342   
(0.0222) 
      
0.0452   
(0.0317)    
0.0464   
(0.0321)    
0.0438   
(0.0314)    
Corruption  -0.0725***  
(0.0228)    
-0.0551**   
(0.0228) 
      
-0.1272***  
(0.0301)    
-0.1312***  
(0.0305)    
-0.1246***  
(0.0300)    
Political Rights   -0.0314   
(0.0259)  
   
   
Democracy    0.0019   
(0.0028) 
      
  
Polity     0.0016   
(0.0024) 




     0.0019   
(0.0031) 
      
Constant 0.6502   
(0.5093)    
0.7234    
(0.5656)    
0.6994   
(0.5269)    
0.6565   
(0.7854)    
0.6673   
(0.7909)    
0.6670    
(0.7793)  
     
R2 between 0.4031     0.4945     0.5833     0.3374     0.3404     0.3364     
No of obs 294 294 294 294 294 294 
 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, 



























-4.3896   
(8.7642) 
 
-5.4639   
(7.4580) 
-4.5458    
(7.3581) 
-4.0866   
(8.2396) 
-4.0088   
(8.3050) 




-320.1278*   
(181.7464) 
 
-82.4292   
(155.4286) 
-153.564   
(158.6333) 
-48.1482   
(175.8041) 
-68.2504   
(175.9168) 
-55.7596   
(173.4557) 
GDP 425.0333   
(309.8086) 
 
-73.5253   
(273.5133) 
51.58256   
(279.1417) 
147.6586   
(307.0179) 
137.0141   
(309.3995) 
151.496   
(304.4822) 
Openness 2.3885   
(2.2989) 
 
1.9571   
(1.9611) 
1.1111   
(1.9937) 
3.4489   
(2.5511) 
3.6040    
(2.5636) 
3.8155   
(2.5049) 
Population -627.474***   
(602.6703) 
 




-024.416***   
(718.4538) 
-002.233***   
(724.0051) 
-067.743***   
(712.7683) 
Corruption  107.2778**   
(41.5535) 
94.4075**   
(41.5905) 
119.1196***   
(43.4249) 





Political Rights   -59.3462*    
(35.175) 
 
   










     -9.7141***   
(3.5631) 
 
Constant 23666.11***  
(8631.381) 
12315.64   
(7530.858) 
13998.29**   
(7476.502) 
32373.91***   
(10702.26) 





R2 between 0.1878 0.1799 0.2202 0.4276 0.4187 0.4371 
No of obs 276 276 276 276 276 276 
No of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 































-9.7200    
(13.0922)  
    
-25.7843**   
(10.9762)    
-24.0558**   
(10.8893)    
-20.7653*   
(11.1413)    
-21.4201*   
(11.1844)    
-20.6911*   
(11.0463)    
Central bank 
independence 
-315.3133*   
(185.7305) 
     
-6.4293   
(151.7471)   
-73.5152    
(155.719)    
37.6622   
(172.1618)   
23.7094   
(172.2516)   
29.3783   
(169.8886)   
GDP 414.8378   
(315.5776)  
     
-189.3043   
(267.1283)   
-70.8313   
(274.1862)   
38.3509   
(300.7482)   
23.6484   
(302.2846)   
43.0457   
(298.2383)   
Openness 2.3704   
(2.3503)  
     
2.1032   
(1.8812)     
1.3332   
(1.9201)     
2.9431   
(2.4685)     
3.0563   
(2.4760)     
3.2949   
(2.4249)     
Population -625.703***   
(595.0631)   
-520.7443    
(500.08) 
     
-662.1788   
(501.7002)   
-1731.666**  
(692.9722)   
-1695.556**  
(696.4932)   
-1777.595**  




      
-
107.0394***  
(39.9967)    
-
126.8186***  
(40.8949)    
-
119.5352***  
(41.1541)    
-127.962***   
(40.5592)    
Political Rights   -53.4037   
(33.9079) 
     
   
Democracy    -7.9454**    
(3.1086) 
     
  
Polity     -6.2747**   
(2.5495) 




      -9.2826***   
(3.4329)  
    
Constant 23880.72***  
(8530.941)   
10259.94   
(7153.348)   
11800.21   
(7128.032)   
28697.24***  
(10250.72)   
28254.98***  
(10303.05)   
29405.74***  
(10171.87) 
     
R2 between 0.1923      0.2463      0.2788      0.4711      0.4655      0.4800 
No of obs 276 276 276 276 276 276 
No of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 













Table 6. Conditional effects of corruption and political institutions 
 
















-0.0143**   
(0.0067)  
   
 -28.1047*   
(16.3055)   








     
 -
71.6409***   
(16.4708)    




-0.0352   
(0.1980)   
-0.1276   
(0.1946)   
15.0023   
(179.4495) 
53.1091   
(150.7807) 
      
  
M2 0.1020***  
(0.0250)   
0.0983***  
(0.0237) 
     
    
GDP -
0.2104***  
(0.0578)   
-
0.1629***  
(0.0581)   
52.8490   
(310.2108)
      
134.0658   
(263.8617)   
1148.653   
(1815.006)  
546.6188    
(1156.83)  
     -0.0713***   
(0.0091)  
    
-0.0303***   
(0.0084)    
Openness -0.0001  
(0.0010)   
-0.0002   
(0.0010)   
1.5416   
(2.7584)    
1.0767  
(2.1968)     
-17.4974   
(41.2849) 
     
-2.6873   
(29.2362)   
Population 0.0324   
(0.0320)   
0.0372   
(0.0323)   
-1330.076   
(819.1426)  
-1223.538*   
(619.8374)   
-1742.2   
(1191.689) 
     
-1225.501   
(779.5313)  
Corruption -0.0889*   
(0.0465)   
-0.0581   
(0.0475)   
-13.007   
(88.3527)   
-67.2743   
(61.9366)    
-127.8501   
(1286.163) 
      
-603.8841   
(791.484)   
Democracy 0.0019   
(0.0068)   
 -10.0423   
(8.2475)    
-7.7416   
(5.8179)    
-1.5947   
(369.4532) 
     
347.5146   
(241.9974)  
Corruption*Dec -0.0014   
(0.0009)   
-0.0025**   
(0.0012)   
-4.5369*   
(2.6540)   
-9.0087***  
(2.3411)    
17.0136   
(39.0174)  
     
34.8798   
(31.8542)   
Demo*Dec -0.0000   
(0.0001)   
-0.0000   
(0.0001)   
0.0578   
(0.2014)    
0.0497   
(0.1761)     
3.1053   
(9.1577)  
     
-5.6113   
(7.7528)    
Constant 1.4690*  
(0.8220)   
1.2440   
(0.8373)   
22156.94*   
(12155.74)  
20311.32**  
(9208.011)   
17321.16   
(26545.97) 
      
15623.28   
(17641.03)  
R2 between 0.3490 0.3948 0. 4696 0.6223 0.8045 0.4550 
No of obs 294 294 276 276 294 294 
 49 49 46 46 49 49 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, 
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Appendix 1. Countries included in the sample 
 
Argentina Iceland Portugal 
Australia India Romania 
Austria Indonesia Russian Federation 
Bahrain Iran Senegal 
Belarus Ireland Slovak Republic 
Belgium Israel Slovenia 
Bolivia Italy South Africa 
Brazil Latvia Spain 
Bulgaria Lithuania Sweden 
Canada Luxembourg Switzerland 
Chile Malaysia Thailand 
China Mauritius United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Mexico United States 
Croatia Moldova Uruguay 
Czech Republic Mongolia Zimbabwe 
Denmark Netherlands  
Dominican Republic Netherlands Antilles  
Estonia New Zealand  
Finland Norway  
France Panama  
Georgia Paraguay  
Germany Peru  



























Appendix 2. Description of the variables 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Expenditure decentralization Share of expenditures of all subnational 
governments in total expenditures of 
consolidated central budget measured in 
percents.  
Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF 
Revenue decentralization Share of revenues of all subnational 
governments in total revenues of 
consolidated central 
budget measured in percents.  
Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF 
Inflation rate CPI index. World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
Exchange rate The change in the nominal parallel 
market exchanger 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) 
 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product percapita (USD 
2000) 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
Population Total population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship-except for refugees not 
permanently 
settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the 
population of 
their country of origin 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
M2 M2 as a percentage of GDP World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
Government Size Total government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF  and World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
Openess Sum of trade (imports and exports) as a 
percentage of GDP. 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
Corruption indices Scale from 0 to 10, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance 
outcomes 
Transparency International 
Democracy The general openness of political 
institutions. The 11-point Democracy 
scale is constructed additively. Scale from 
0 to 10 (0 = low; 10 = high) 
Polity IV data det 
Polity 
 
Combined Polity Score, computed by 
subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC. Scale 
form -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 
= high democracy) 
Polity IV data det 
Constraint on Executive Operational (de facto) independence of 
chief executive. Scale 0 to 10. 
Polity IV data det 
Political Rights Political rights is defined as the rights that 
enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to 
vote freely for distinct alternatives in 
legitimate elections, compete for public 
office, join political parties and 
organizations, and elect representatives 
who have a decisive impact on public 





electorate. Scale 1 to 7 (1 = highest 
degree of freedom and 7= the least 
amount of freedom). 
Central Bank independence The index assesses the fulfillment of 16 
criteria of political and economic 
independence using a continuous scale 
from zero to one, with higher values also 
indicating higher CBI. The overall index 
is based on a weighted average of the 
individual criteria. 
Cukierman et al. (1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
